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One approach  to trade  policy  among  the former  Soviet  republics
is to have no trade  policy  - to have completely  free trade with
convertibility for current account transactions.  Trade policy
should  be transparent.  Any  tariff  and  export  tax structures  should
be simple. Quantitative  controls should be avoided. And no
barriers  to existing trade  between  the republics  should  be intro-
duced.
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This paper  -a  product  of the Trade Policy  Division,  Country  Economics  Department -was  prepared
under the  auspices  of the UNDP/  World  Bank  Trade Expansion  Program.  Copies  of the paper  are available
free from  the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington  DC 20433.  Please  contact  CECTP,  room N10-
023, extension  37947 (May 1992,  53 pages).
Taking  the long view (assuming  prices  have  The case for a free trade area is strong
been  liberalized),  Corden reviews  possible  trade  because  the republics  of the former  Soviet  Union
and exchange  rate policies  of the republics  of the  are so highly specialized,  but there will be
former  Soviet  Union.  problems  if price controls  remain and differ
among  the republics.  There could  be a free trade
He considers alternative  exchange-rate  area even if there is no monetary  union. A
regimes,  including  a monetary  union.  For Russia,  customs  union, involving  a common  extemal
a fixed but adjustable  regime is most realistic.  tariff, would  prevent  border controls  and trade
Frequent  adjustment  may be desirable,  to prevent  deflection  but would make a common  tariff
the use of trade restrictions  to achieve  balance  of  policy (and hence a joint tariff commission)
payments  objectives.  necessary.
Trade intervention  policies,  if needed,  should  One approach  to trade policy,  Corden
not weaken  the fiscal  situation.  There may  be a  concludes,  is in effect to t"ve no trade  policy-
case for export  taxes or for a uniform  revenue  to have completely  free trade with convertibility
tariff, for example,  but subsidies  and quantitative  for current account  transactions.  Some tariffs  and
restrictions  should be avoided.  If some domestic  export taxes  may be justified, at least as second-
price  controls remain,  export  taxes are needed.  best policies.  If so, however,  Corden  stresses  that
four principles  be observed:
Corden  examines  the need for transitional
tariffs, including  the argument  for a temporary  * Barriers  to existing traWz  between  the
uniform  tariff that is higher  than the long-run  republics  should  not be set up.
revenue  tariff. The temporary  uniform  tariff  *  All quantitative  control  measures  should  be
would be designed  to prevent  temporary  over-  avoided.
shooting  of the exchange  rate  - but the argu-  * Tariff and export tax structures  should  be
ment is subject to important  qualifications.  If  very simple.
there is any protection  of infant  industries,  there  * Trade policy should  be transparenL
must be a "hard tariff' path  - the gradual
decline  of the tariff rate should  be firmly  pro-
vided  for in advance.
ThePolicy  Research  Woking PaperSeriesdisseniinates  thefindings  of work  under  way  in  theBanlk  Anobjectiveof  the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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iiPRELIMINARIES
1.  INTROLUCTION
This paper aims to discuss analytically a number of issues
likely to arise when considering  future trade policy and economic
integration arrangements of the Republics of the former Soviet
Union.  Particular attention will be paid to the relation between
trade and macroeconomic policies, especially exchange rate
policy.  In fact, policy towards the exchange rate and the
related "convertibility" issue must be central to the discussion.
We can distinguish those issues that are special to the
former Soviet situation from those which are familiar in market
economies. Naturally the former are more interesting and also
less understood, so they will be  - -cussed in some detail
below.  But the latter  issues are  so important and will become
increasingly relevant as the Republics acquire more and more the
characteristics of market economies. Not all the problems and
choices facing the republics of the former Soviet Union are
unknown.  Some are familiar problems where there is much
experience and analysis to draw upon from market economies, both
developed and developing. Examples  are the use of trade policy
to encourage or ensure domestic competition, versus its use for
I  I am indebted to comments on an ear'lier  draft from Jaime
de Melo, John Nash and David Tarr.
1job protection; the infant industry argument for protection; and
the relationship between exchange rate and trade policy.
Out of the Soviet Union has emerged one very large economy,
Russia; one medium-sized economy, the Ukraine; and thirteen small
ones, the latter being .lt  very different stages of development.
At the time of writing  (January 1992) Russia was taking radical
steps to move towards free market pricing, but it was not clear
which of the other Republics would follow. One might expect the
Baltic Republics and Georgia to move  (or try to move) towards the
market fairly rapidly, and four or five of the central Asian
republics to move more slowly, if at all, while the matter is
still uncertain with regard to the others. But all such remarks
are just speculation and can soon be negated by events. 2
In looking ahead it is useful to think in terms of three time
periods or episodes.
The first is the transition -eriod  during which a Republic takes
the essential steps to create a domestic market economy, freeing
most domestic prices and creating incentives for state-owned  and
privately-owned enterprises to respond in a market way, notably
by removing various restrictions, and providing the necessary
legal framework, taxation system, and so on.  Possibly this stage
would require extensive privatization.  There is no shortage of
discussion of the characteristics  and vast problems of such a
transformation, and here it will be assumed that it takes place,
2  For background on the recent state of the Soviet
economy, see International Monetary Fund, et al. (1991) and
Aslund  (1991).  Many of the issues of this paper are discussed
in International Monetary Fund, et al. (1991), in Williamson
(1991), and in Havrylyshyn  and Williamson  (1991),  the latter
dealing particularly with monetary stabilization, with exchange
rate policy, and with the question of the financing of bilateral
payments imbalances.  The last subject is not discussed here.
See also Tarr  (1991), Havrylyshyn  and Tarr (1991),  Cooper
(1991), and Gros and Steinherr  (1991).
2whether in an orderly or a chaotic way.  One might imagine this
stage to take two years  (but that is just a casual guess!).
Se;ondly, there is the adjustment geriod.  During this period the
economy is mainly a market economy; the institutiors and rules of
a new system have been  (more or less) installed, but industries
and the population are going through an extended adjustment
process, involving major resource reallocation, income
redistribution, and accumulation of new forms of physical and
human capital.  The economy is adjusting to the changes in
institutions and rules.  I would expect this stage to last
perhaps ten years.
The third stage is the normality stage when the economy is a
fairly normal market economy, with normal  (and familiar)
problems, but the drastic adjustment process in response to the
transition from socialism is clearly at an end.
This paper will say only a little about trade policy during the
first period.  It will be mainly concerned with the second period
and, to a lesser extent, with the third.  Thus the paper really
looks ahead and assumes a successful transition.  Nevertheless,
most of the issues discussed are currently relevant for those
Republics, notably Russia, where there is already a partial
transition--since the foundations for the second period are beinag
laid.
At various points, "first-best" policies will be proposed.
But one cannot be under any illusion that such policies will
necessarily be followed, no more than first-best policies from
a national (as distinct from a special interest group) point of
view are consistently followed in the major market economies.
Hence, there has to be a good deal of "second-best" analysis.
3one preliminary warning is perhaps obvious.  A paper which is
designed to clarify some issues cannct claim to have simple
solutions to problems that everybody knows to be immense and
possibly not solvable by means that are socially or politically
acceptable.  Furthermore, there is complete uncertainty about the
starting point:  what will the economies loolc  like at the time
when coherent trade and exchange rate policies will actually
begin to be implemented  (at some stage during tlh transition)?
Nor do we know when this will be.
2.  DEFINITIONS
(a) The Meaning of Trade Policy
One should first define  "trade policy."  In the socialist system
it consists of the processes and decisions which determine
quantities of various goods and services imported and exported,
and the prices at which trade will take place.  This involves
negotiations with foreign suppliers and buyers and then central
instructions to domestic suppliers of exports to ensure that the
trade commitments are fulfilled.  As is well known, Soviet trade
took place through the intermediation of a limited number of
foreign trade organization.; there was not a direct relationship
between So  -4et  export prodi-ers or users of imported inputs and
foreign purchasers or suppliers. 3
In the market system the matter is different.  Trade policy does
involve government negotiations with foreign governments with
regard to their trade restrictions and also commitments with
regard to the country's own restrictions  (for example, through
membership in GATT), and to that extent there is some similarity.
3  For descriptions of the system, see Aslund  (1991)  and
International Monetary Fund, et al.  (1991, Chapter IV.3).
4But this aspect will not be discussed here.  For given foreign
restrictions, quantities and prices in trade are determined in a
decentralized way and do not necessarily involve "policy" at all.
There is no need for centralized det-rmination of quantities
traded or of the prices at which trade takes place.  Of cotrse,
there is still a role for official guidance about demand and'
supply prospects--i.e.,  for the provision of information--and for
the provision of infrastructure which is required for all
economic activities.
In this paper much attention must be paid to exchange rate and
exchange control policies--though  these are not conventionally
included in the term "trade policy."  The conventional usage
defines trade policy as referring to various interventions in
trade, with the exchange rate as giveni:  it refers to tariffs,
quantitative import restrictions, export subsidies and taxes and
(in a broader definition), subsidies and taxes for domestic
production and consumption that discriminate in favor or against
specific tradable goods.  If there is a single, unified exchange
rate with full current account convertibility  (discussed below),
and there are no such interventions, then there is "free
trade"--the limiting case of a passive trade policy.  Much of
this paper will be concerned with exchange rate policy and with
various possible departures  from free trade, especially in the
form of tariffs and export taxes.
(b) The Meaning of Convertibility
In the Soviet Union the distinction was made between commodity
convertibility and currency convertibility.  The former referred
to the ability to convert domestic currency (roubles) into
domestic goods and services.  Such convertibility is, of course,
taken for granted in a market system.  There was absence of
commodity convertibility  for two reasons. First, the savings of
5enterprises  in "enterprise accounts" in banks were not allowed to
be spent,  i.e., to be converted by the enterprises without
special permission.  They were blocked.  Second, households  and
enterprises  (notably cooperatives) that were allowed to spend
their roubles were not always able to buy goods with them owing
to generalized  shortages.  Here it will be assumed that during
the transition to a market economy, full commodity convertibility
is established.
Currency convertibility refers to the ability to crnvert roubles
freely into foreign currency.  Outside the former Soviet Union
the term "convertibility" refers just to this concept.  But here
a further distinction can be  made between current account
convertibility and unrestricted convertibility, the latter
including also convertibility for capital account transactions.4
When there are exchange controls on capital account transactions,
capital account convertibility does not exist or, at least, is
not complete.  Finally, in the  former socialist countries of
Eastern  (or Central) Europe, the distinction is also made between
current account convertibility for domestic residents, called
internal convertibility, and convertibility for foreigners,
called external convertibility, the latter concerning
particularly remittances of interest and dividends, as well as
the ability to repatriate capital (the latter being part of
capital account convertibility).
For the present paper the convertibility that is relevant is
current account convertibility for domestic residents, and the
simple term "convertibility" will henceforth refer to this.
Two points need to be stressed about convertibility.  First,
4  See Williamson  (1991, pp. 376-380) for discussion of
concepts of convertibility.
6if A  currency becomes convertible, this does not mean that it has
to be convertible at a fixed exchange rate.  The exchange rate
can float, or be adjusted flexibly.  It is often said that
convertibility requires foreign financial support, implying that,
because of speculation  (indirect zapital movements, perhaps
throuqh leads and lags) or other reasons, the Republic's
foreign exchange reserves might run out unless confidence is
established by the existence of an adequate reserve of available
foreign currency.  This would be true if there were a commitment
to a fixed exchange rate.  In the a'  ;ence of such a commitment
it would also be true if it were desired to avoid a sharp
depreciation of the currency once convertibility was established.
But if there is a willingness to accept exchange rate
flexibility, and thus the possible overshooting ot the exchange
rate in the short run, convertibility can be established without
large foreign exchange reserves or foreign assistance.
Second, when a  currency is not completely convertible
(for current account transactions by residenta), the effect
is much the same as when import restrictions are imposed.
Inconvertibility--or convertibility subject to controls--has
much the same effect as trade policy  interventions.  Of course,
administratively there may be differences, and it all depends on
the details.  But if the currency is not completely convertible
(in  the sense defined here), one cannot say that there is free
trade e:en if there are no tariffs or quantitative import
restrictions.  It will now be assumed that complete current
account convertibility for residents is established, this being
an element of the transition tc a market economy.  Trade policy
thus takes the form of tariffs, import restrictions, export taxes
and subsidies, and so on.  In zxlition, there can be exchange
controls  'or  capital account transactions; it is suggested by
man.,  commentators that such controls should be maintained, but
this issue goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
73. MONETARY OVERHANG. FISCAL DEFICITS AND GENERAL DISEQUILIBRIUM
The following remarks apply to the situation at the end of 1991.
At that point  (and still at the time of writing in January  1992),
there was generalized excess demand resulting from a massive
monetary overhang which had been rapidly increasing owing to
out-of-control fiscal deficits.  While the seeds were laid
earlier--by financially irresponsible policies 1985 and 1986--the
policies that led to the serious crisis of 1989 really began in
1988, with the Law of State Enterprises.  Aslund  (1991, Chapter
7) describes in fascirating detail and very clearly how the
eycess demand situation and consequent crisis came abotut. In
addition to the central government and enterprise deficits, the
financial balances of the enterpises  became more liquid  (for
several reasons), so that not only the money supply but also
velocity increased.  This is a simple explanation for the
increasing open inflation in that part of the economy where
prices have been flexible.  But at  the end of 1991 the fomer
Soviet Union was not in a typical situation of high inflation.
In the larger part of the ex-Soviet economy, prices were fixed,
so that there was excess demand, generating the shortages and
queuing wi-ch have dominated Soviet urban life.  Since many goods
have simply been unobtainable  (except  with much effort), the
incentive to earn more roibles has been reduced, and this appears
to have been a major element in the contraction of supply.  This
problem would disappear  if prices were generally freed  (or the
relative size of the market sector were greatly expanded), in
which case repressed  inflation would be converted into open
inflation.  This process may now be underway, or would be if
price liberalization were continued while excessive growth of
the money supply to finance deficits continued.
But there has been a further complication, unique to the Soviet
system.  As noted above, roubles credited to enterprises and
8deposited in banks have not been available to them automatically
to be spent freely.  Thus, there have been two reasons for lack
of commodity convertibility, and thus  two reasons for a lack of
incentives to earn roubles by producing and selling goods  There
may be other reasons also for the decline in supplies, given that
the command-and-control system of determining supplies has broken
down.  But the monetary disequilibrium combined with the fixing
of major prices provide sufficient explanation.  In any case, the
establishment of a  domestic market system clearly requires both
the freeing of most prices and the unblocking of enterprise
accounts.
Price increases could naturally eliminate the mcnetary overhang,
though other methods are also possible, such as the conversion of
currency and monetary deposits into longer-term bonds of some
kind (possibly usable eventually for the purchase of privatized
assets).  In addition, it is clearly necessary for the fiscal and
enterprise deficits to be ended or greatly reduced.
In the absence of macroeconomic stabilization, the economy
would convert into high or hyperinflation.  As can be observed
from the experience of various Latin American countries, notably
Argentina and Brazil, high open inflation, while having adverse
effects on growth and in extreme cases (such as Brazil recently)
actually leading to declines in output, it need not lead to the
kind of precipitous declines in output that have been seen in
the former Soviet Union.  Thus, the conversion of repressed
into open inflation--arn hence the creation of commodity
convertibility-- would in itself be beneficial for supplies.
It should be added that Brazil (the major current example of
extremely high inflation) has been able to adjust to very high
inflation to some extent because of the availability of financial
institutions and indexing arrangements that take time to evolve
and that, in any case, are not available in the former Soviet
Union.
9Nevertheless, in high inflation  (end even more, hyperinflation),
relative prices also get highly distorted and prices fail in
their signalling role.  In other words, unless there is
macroeconomic stabilization,  in addition to domestic price
liberalization, there is little point in attempting coherent
trade policies of the kind to be discussed below.  Hence,  I shall
now assume 5 that the overwhelming macro problem has been dealt
with.  This does not mean that one has to assume zero inflation
and zero fiscal deficits,'but they have to be moderate and under
control.  This, of course, is not a forecast, but is a starting
point required for a coherent trade policy.
Once stabilization has been brought about, the maintenance of
fiscal balance and strict monetary control should be the first
concern of all policies, and all other concerns should be
secondary.  It must never be forgotten that the transformation of
the era of stagnation into the years of crisis is essentially
explained by the failure of fiscal and monetary control.6 This
has important implications for trade policy.
The fiscal implications of policies become crucial.  There
may be a strong argument to impose trade taxes in order to
raise revenue, if this is a convenient or politically acceptable
way of taxing.  Such an argument for tariffs or export taxes
should outweigh a concern with the undesired protection of
import-competing industries that would be a by-product.
Proposals for subsidies should be ruled out since, indeed, so
many existing subsidies have to be eliminated.  The subsidy habit
should be ended.  In standard trade theory, a case is often made
in favor of the use of subsidies rather than tariffs or import
restrictions to deal with  "domestic distortions."  But in
5 Like the economist  in the famous can-opener fable.
6  See Aslund  (1991).
10the current and prospective situation of the former Soviet
Republics, either tariffs  (or export taxes) should be used, or
the distortions themselves must either be eliminated or their
consequences lived with.  Furthermore, apart from all other
considerations, tariffs should always be preferred to import
restrictions because of the favorable revenue effects.
At the beginning of the paper it was noted that there are some
issues that are special to the former Soviet Union, while others
are familiar.  Issues connected with open inflation are certainly
not special, but those resulting from large-scale repressed
inflation and hence commodity inconvertibility are.  Thus, this
is the first of the "special" issues.  We now turn to two other's.
4.  EXTREME SPECIALIZATION
A special feature of the ex-Soviet economy is extreme
specialization of production.  It has resulted from a Soviet
planning system which reflected an excessive belief in
economies-of-scale and placed no value on the availability of
product variety or competition.  Reducing the number of
enterprises to which the planners sent their instructions was
also meant to make planning easier.  The net result has been a
degree of concentration  of production that is quite extraordinary
by Western standards.7
This extreme specialization has a number of implications.
First, it means that a large volume of trade between the
Republics will have to continue, even if they do have their
7  For details, see International Monetary Fund, et al.
(1991,  pp. 36-38).
11separate trade policies and trade with the outside world is
freed.  In a free market situation, they are likely to do much
more trade with each other than with the outside world.  The
imposition of restrictive import or export quotas on trade with
each other could have severe costs and should be ruled out.
Any measures that improve the convenience or smoothness of
inter-Republic trade will be beneficial, so that, for this
reason, there is a strong case for a free trade area.  Opening
up to outside trade may well reduce interdependence between the
Republics somewhat, but this will be limited by the ability to
generate exports to obtain alternative imports from abroad.
Second, extreme specialization means that, in a free market, and
in the absence of new competition from outside, there would be
many situations of near or complete bilateral monopoly, leading
to difficult bargaining situations that could get politicized and
induce trade frictions.  It is then particularly desirable to
open external trade so as to increase competition.  Such opening
of trade to the outside world may not always lead to actual
increases in imports from, or exportz to, the outside world,
but the potential trade will provide a discipline for
both buyers and sellers.  The most common argument for
free--or relatively free--trade is that it encourages
international specialization of production on the basis of
comparative advantage.  This certainly applies to the Republics,
as to all other countries.  But a second, distinct argument is
that free trade provides competition from imports for local
producers, and competition from export demand for local
monopsonistic buyers of domestic products.  This argument is
overwhielmingly  important in the case of the former Soviet Union,
where domestic production is so highly concentrated that there is
an exceptional need for the discipline of competition to come
from abroad.
12Third, extreme specialization is likely to lead to strong
pressures to reduce interdependence by pursuing policies of
import substitution within the separate Republics. The argument
will be made that import substitution is necessary to increase
competition, and perhaps to avoid exploitation by monopoly
suppliers in other Republics.  On the other hand, it is quite
likely that when the centralized bias to extreme specialization
is removed and market forces are allowed to work, local
production of various products, perhaps differentiated somewhat
from imports from other Republics, will begin even without
protection.  Hence, there is not necessarily an argument here
for protection.  More important, it must be remembered that
imports from outside the former Soviet Union will also provide
alternative supplies.
5. DISEOUILIBRIUM PRICING
It seems reasonable to expect that currency convertibility will
be introduced as a crucial step in the transition process and
that prices will generally be freed.  In any case, this will be
assumed here.  Nevertheless, it is probable that some prices will
continue to be kept below their market value by price controls or
arbitrary decisions.  This is likely for food and energy prices,
for example.  There would no longer be generalized excess
demand, but there would be excess demand for particular goods
and services.  A dual economy would thus emerge--a dominant
market economy and a smaller non-market economy.  Up to 1991
the controlled economy dominated while the market economy was
relatively small.  In the new situation the market economy
would dominate but probably there would still be a significant
13non-market economy. 8 Thus, the third special feature of the
ex-Soviet situation is the likelihood that a significant
non-market sector--much greater proportionally than in most
or all developing market economies--would remain.  There will
thus be a relative price distortion--or, indeed, many
distortions--which  optimal trade policy will need to take into
account.
One branch of the theory of trade policy is concerned with the
relationship between "domestic distortions" and trade policy.
The standard recommendation is that first-best policy is to
remove the domestic distortions, and then accompany this with
free trade, unless there are other arguments for trade
intervention.  Free trade means here complete convertibility of
the Republic's currency for current account transactions, and
absence of trade policy interventions, such as tariffs, export
taxes, and import quotas.  But it may be that this first-best
policy of removing "domestic distortions" cannot be or will not
be implemented.  A distortion  (such as price control on some
basic goods) may be justifiable for distributional or political
reasons.  In that case, trade policy has to take the distortion
policy as given, and try to offset some of its otherwise adverse
effects.  One intervention (trade policy) then modifies the by-
product distortions that result from another intervention
(sectional controlled prices, in this case).  It is likely that
this consideration will be important in forming trade policy in
8  The theory of dual exchange rates is applicable
to studying the implications of such dual economies.
Many developing countries have had an official--i.e.,
controlled--exchange  rate, and a free or black market rate,
and over time the relative importance of the latter has
increased.  The economic implications of such arrangements
have been much studied (for the theory, see Corden, 1971,
pp. 87-92), and the analysis is relevant for the socialist
transition societies.
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early adjustment stage.
The price of an exportable product--say, energy in Russia or
grain in the Ukraine--may be underpriced to domestic industrial
and household consumers.  If suppliers were free to export as
much as they wished, there would then be an incentive to export
more than they would  if prices were flexible.  Indeed, if
domestic prices are rigidly fixed below export prices  (allowing
for transport costs), all domestic production would be exported
in the absence of controls. Controls on exports, or an adequate
export tax, would then be needed.
This case is represented  in Figure 1.  The world market price is
OP 1. If there were no price control, exports would be LK.  But
there is a controlled price of OP 2 which applies only to sales in
the home market.  In the absence of export controls, everything
would be exported  (i.e., OK) at the price OP 1.
Further controls need to keep some of the good at home.  There
are three possibilities.  (i) Controls keep OL at home.  Exports
would be LK, which  is the non-intervention result.  But there
would be excess demand at home of LJ.  (ii) Controls keep 03 at
home.  Excess demand at home would be avoided, but there would be
under-exporting of LJ, in the sense that an opportunity  to export
products at a cost less than the price received would be
foregone.  (iii) An export tax of P,P 2 is imposed.  Hence, the
net price received by exporters would be reduced to P 2, and
production would  fall to OH and exports to JH.  Even without any
price control, the price to domestic consumers would fall to
OP 2, so that price controls would become redundant  (or easily
enforceable).  There would be no excess demand at home but
under-exporting would be greatest, namely, at LJ+ HK.
15Policy  (i)  would avoid under-exporting; that would be its
advantage, but it would lead to excess demand at home.  Solution
(ii) would avoid excess demand at home, but would lead to
under-exporting.  Solution  (iii) would have two advantages:
First, it would eliminate the need for price control, with its
enforcement problem;  it is surely easier to enforce an export tax
than a control on domestic sales. Second, it would bring in
revenue from the export tax represented by the shaded area,
surely a major attraction.  On the other hand, it would lead to
under-exporting not only through the diversion of given output t(
the home market but also through reduced production.
There is a fourth possibility, namely, to subsidize home
consumption by PtP2  per unit.  But, as noted earlier, that is
the kind of policy which has led to the current macroeconomic
problems in the former Soviet Union because of the fiscal cost,
and hence can be dismissed.
The issue just discussed  is highly relevant at the time of
writing (January 1992) when Russia is liberalizing prices but
the other Republics have not done so. In spite of various
controls, there is a considerable degree of free trade between
the Republics.  The natural tendency is then for producers of
price-controlled commodities  in, say the Ukraine, to export to
Russia and keep their home market short, possibly failing to
supply it completely.  When there is general price liberalization
in Russia but not in Ukraine, supplies will naturally be diverted
on a large scale from Ukraine to Russia, the only limits being
transport problems, and controls or taxes that Ukraine is
actually able to enforce.  Unless Ukraine imposes export taxes or
controls, and is able to enforce them, the only other alternative
is to follow Russia with price liberalization.  The current
policy issue is thus very similar to the more long-term issue
discussed above.  (Thus, price liberalization in Russia creates
16pressure for others to liberalize, a case of a good policy
driving out a bad one!)
Finally, another case of a controlled price to domestic consumers
may be noted here.  This time it concerna a product where there
are, or would be, imports rather than exports.  The price of a
particular food product may be underpriced to domestic consumers
because of price controls.  This price-control policy will then
lead to inadequate domestic production, something that is beyond
the power of pure trade policy to deal with.  But it will have
two other effects.  First  (assuming the controls also apply to
imports), it will lead to less imports of the controlled product
than would take place in the absence of controls, and possibly
none at all.  Second, it will lead to excess demand that is
satisfied by imports of a substitute where there are no controls.
There will then be both a distortion in the pattern of imports
and a net increase in total imports as the consumption of the
imported substitute replaces consumption of the locally-produced
product.  One possible second-best approach (which cannot
actually remove the distortion) would be to tax imports of the
substitute and use the revenue to subsidize imports of the
price-controlled product.
The general conclusion  is that disequilibrium pricing should
be avoided, and certainly should not be part of the third
period--the period of normalcv.  But, for distributional and
political reasons, it is likely to be unavoidable during the
early part of the adjustment period, and thus some export taxes,
and possibly also tariffs, may be needed.
17II  .
EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICY
1.  EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICY  FOR RUSSIA
Exchange rate policy and trade policy are closely related.  We
begin with an extended discussion of possible exchange rate
regimes.  Here it is necessary to distinguish Russia from the
other Republics.
For Russia there are essentially three alternatives, namely, a
fixed exchange rate regime, a flexible peg regime--where the
exchange rate is fixed by the monetary authorities at a point
in time by intervention, but is frequently or occasionally
adjusted--and a floating rate regime, where the rate is fully
determined by the market, without intervention.  In the fixed
rate regime the rate would be fixed to an outside currency, such
as the D-Mark or the dollar, or to a basket, such as the ECU, the
SDR, or a special trade-weighted oasket calculated specifically
for Russia.  For the other Republics there are the further
alternatives of fixing the rate to the (Russian) rouble, of
forming or joining a monetary union with Russia, and of forming
a monetary union with some Republics other than Russia.
It is inconceivable that Russia would establish a fixed rate
regime of the first kind, and it can certainly not be
recommended.
Of course, the advantages of such an arrangement are well known.
Inflation would be kept down, provided domestic monetary policy
were adapted to the exchange rate commitment.  The exchange rate
commitment might provide a discipline on monetary policy.  A
decline in the foreign exchange reserves would have to compel a
18policy of monetary contraction.  If the commitment were seen to
be firm, and possibly were embodied in a constitution either of
the nation itself or of its central bank, speculation on the
exchange rate should be avoided and, in addition, domestic wage
demands would not be based on inflationary expectations. But it
is highly unlikely that Russia would allow its monetary  (and
fiscal) policy to be determined so completely by what would
appear as external considerations.  Given that trade with the
outside (non-ex-Soviet) world is, and will remain, a small
proportion of GDP, one cannot believe that the foreign trade
tail would be allowed to wag the monetary  (and hence fiscal) dog.
Quite apart from this consideration, there is also the well-known
disadvantage of a fixed rate regime.  An instrument of policy is
given up.  There are circumstances when exchange rate adjustment
can play a useful policy role, principally when a country suffers
an adverse shock--a decline in the terms of trade, a politically
unavoidable r1se in the general wage level, or a cessation of
capital inflow.  In such circumstances, a rise in the relative
price of tradables to nontradables may be required, and this
would be brought about more easily and quickly by a devaluation
than by squeezing domestic demand with the hope that eventually
domestic prices of nontradables and wages would fall
sufficiently.
In the case of a nation going through a radical transition
and adjustment process, an additional consideration is very
relevant.  There is complete uncertainty about the way in which
the economy will evolve--its capacity to produce once the central
macroeconomic problem is dealt with,  its success in foreign
trade, its methods of wage determination,  and so on.  Hence, it
will be quite uncertain what the right exchange rate should be
when the new regime is instituted.  If it turned out to be wrong
and yet could not be altered, owing to a firm exchange rate
commitment having been made, the domestic level of nominal wages
19might need to be adjusted to turn the fixed nominal exchange rate
into the "right" rate.  This would be no prublem if the initial
rate were undervalued, since wages could easily rise, but it
would be a big problem if the exchange rate were grossly
overvalued.  If the exchange rate were finally devalued in spite
of the initial commitment to keep it fixed, the government's
credibility would suffer.
Another possibility is a floating exchange rate regime.  But this
can also be dismissed.
One can conceive of a  floating exchange rate for a limited number
of transactions--for example, for tourism and  capital movements.
But it is improbable that Russia would willingly choose a unified
floating rate for all its foreign trade transactions for a
prolonged period  (i.e., other than during a brief transition).
The people of Russia have been used to excessive price stability
and have a great dislike of "speculation."  Hence, they are
hardly likely to accept a system where the exchange rate for
important transactions--such as food imports and energy
exports--fluctuates day by day, often in ways that mystify even
the market participants themselves, let alone academic observers.
Such a  regime would certainly be a discouragement to trade with
the outside world, something which it is desirable to expand.
In addition, Williamson  (1991, p. 393) gives other arguments
against floating in the emerging market economies of Eastern
Europe, and these also apply to Russia.  First, he makes the
point that a floating rate needs to be associated with a
reasonably predictable monetary policy  (defined by some sort of
aggregate), in order to anchor expectations to some extent. But
this is almost impossible when the monetary systems are so new.
Second, a floating system can only operate efficiently when there
is a well developed capital market.  Finally, he argues that the
experience of floating in the market economies has not been
20particularly favorable, with large fluctuations in rates
resulting, apparently, from speculative bubbles and sharp
variations  in expectations.  In any case, for the reason given
above, Russia is likely to find a pure floating regime an
unacceptable gamble.
One is thus left, inevitably, with a "fixed but adjustable"
exchange rate regime for Russia.  The adjustment might be
frequent, in which case the exchange rate becomes a "crawling
peg," or it might be occasional,  in which case it becomes more
like the Bretton Woods or the EMS system.  The less frequontly it
is adjusted, the closer it comes to the fixed rate regime.
Compared with the completely  (firmly) fixed rate regime,
the barrier against inflation, and against speculation on
the exchange rate itself, would be reduced, since an
anti-inflationary commitment made by the monetary authorities
would be less credible than when it was backed by an exchange
rate commitment.  But the main difficulty  is that, while
exchange controls on capital movements will no doubt be
maintained, there are many ways of exporting capital, and
the possibility of profitable speculation on the exchange
rate--leading to foreign exchange crises followed by
devaluation, and hence losses by central banks--would then
arise.
This is the familiar problem of "fixed but adjustable" exchange
rate systems.  The quicker the exchange rate is devalued when
there is speculation against the rouble, the less these losses
would be.  But experience from many market economies, both
developed and developing, shows that there is often a reluctance
to devalue because of the potential .%nflationary  effects of
devaluation--raising the cost of living and thus reducing real
wages,  as well as raising the costs of domestic industries that
21use imported inputs.  One can expect all these problems  .o  arise
in Russia eventually. 9
2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE POLICY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
Before turning to exchange rate policy for the other Republics,
the relevance of exchange rate policy for trade policy  (narrowly
defined as excluding exchange rate policy) needs to be discussed.
The main point is simple and very important.
When a country's foreign exchange reser-ves  run down and
it cannot readily borrow any more, yet it is committed to a
fixed exchange rate, or, in a flexible rate regime, it makes only
infrequent and reluctant adjustments of the exchange rate, a
recourse to trade restrictions is almost inevitable.  Such has
been the experience of many market economies at many times in the
past.  As standard analysis teaches, if equilibrium is to be
re-established, aggregate demand  (absorption) has to be reduced.
But, in addition, some switching of demand away from tradables
towards nontradables and of domestic output in the opposite
direction is usually desirable to minimize adverse employment
effects domestically.  If the exchange rate cannot be used as a
switching instrument, or if there is a reluctance to use it, a
recourse to restrictions on imports is highly likely.
Such restrictions are often difficult to remove later, since
interest groups grow up that benefit from them.  Furthermore,
their later removal may still require some devaluation of the
9  The effects of capital movements could be absorbed by
a floating exchange rate applying only to capital  (and, perhaps,
tourist) transactions.  In other words, as has been widely
suggested, there could be a  dual rate system.  But this would
still require exchange controls to keep the two markets
separate--i.e., to prevent capital movements taking place
at the official rate.
22exchange rate, which  is ruled out by a fixed exchange rate
system.  In the case of the Republics of the former Soviet Union,
one would expect a ready recourse to restrictions since the idea
of quantitative controls is, of course, quite familiar, and an
awareness of the distorting cost of the restrictions is likely to
be low.  In any case, to repeat, it is quite likely that the use
of trade restrictions would be determined to a great extent by
the balance-of-payments  situation.  Such restrictions might Z±eld
short-term benefits in maintaining domestic employment, but would
be offset by longer-term  losses from the distortions in resource
allocation created, and especially from the adverse effects on
exports.
If a country were inflating at a rate faster than its trading
partners, continuous or frequent depreciation of its currency
would be needed to maintain the real exchange rate and thus
competitiveness of its export and import-competing industries.
But if the nominal exchange rate is fixed, this is not possible.
Yet, trade restrictions could only be a short-term substitute
since they could not maintain the competitiveness of export
industries.  Eventually  a devaluation would come about. But the
experience of many countries shows that, in the initial stage,
trade restrictions are indeed often intensified, with adverse
effects in distorting  and reducing trade.
The conclusion is that the case in favor of flexibility of the
rouble exchange rate, involving, if necessary, quite frequent
adjustments, is very strong.  Such flexibility is necessary to
forestall the use of import restrictions for balance-of-payments
purposes, whether in the form of quotas or tariffs.  A
commitment of the government and the monetary authorities to
non-inflationary monetary policies must be direct, rather than
brought about via an exchange rate commitment.
233. EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICY  FOR  THE  OTHER  REPUBLICS
All  the issues just discussed also apply to the other Republics.
But the smaller the economy, the stronger becomes the case for a
fixed exchange rate. 10 But the question rumains:  fixed to
which currency?  To begin, let us consider a small economy, say
Latvia, which is eventually likely to trade extensively with the
European Community.  Here the currency might be fixed to the ECU
or, alternatively, the D-Mark.  All the problems of a fixed rate
just discussed would still arise.  But since trade would be a
much higher proportion  of GDP than in the case of Russia, it is
more plausible that domestic monetary policy be adjusted in the
light of the foreign exchange situation:  the foreign exchange
tail would be a lot bigger relative to the monetary dog than in
the case of Russia.  Furthermore, the gains from exchange rate
stability to the economy would be greater since these gains take
the form of making foreign trade less costly, and foreign trade
is a larger part of the economy than in the case of Russia." 1
Hence, one might conclude that the case for Russia and Ukraine
having flexible exchange rate regimes is very strong, but for the
other thirteen economies--which are much smaller--the possibility
of a fixed rate regime, or a regime of a fixed but infrequently
adjusted rate, should be viewed more favorably.  In all the
latter cases there would still be the problem of determining
the correct rate initially, given that prospects are so
uncertain.  It may be necessary to start with a fixed but
10  This is, essentially, an argument following from the
theory of optimum currency areas.
lt  Perhaps even more important than the gains for trade are
the gains for foreign investment.  If the Latvian currency, for
example, were fixed to the D-Mark, foreign investment from
Germany and indeed, from other members of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the EMS, would surely be encouraged.
24adjustable rate, switching at some later stage to a firmly fixed
rate. Furthermore, there would still be a danger that trade
restrictions would  be used at a time of foreign exchange crisis.
To repeat, all the earlier doubts about fixing the exchange rate
still apply, but the weight of various arguments is different
than in che case of the large economies, namely, Russia and
Ukraine.
The possibility must now be considered that a Republic fix its
exchange rate to the (Russian) rouble.  The argument in favor,
indeed the only argument, is that its trade with Russia may be
very high relative to its trade with the outside world or other
Republics that don't fix to the rouble.  The reason for this is,
of course, the extreme specialization that has been mentioned
earlier.  Here it is important to consider not only the current
flow of trade with Russia--which in all cases is high because of
the extreme specialization--but also the expected flow of trade
in the future, during the normality period.  Many Republics,
notably Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and Moldava, will surely
expect the pattern of their trade to change drastically  in favor
of trade with Western Europe.  If they did wish to fix their
exchange rates--in spite of various considerations noted
earlier--they might be wiser to fix it to the D-Mark or ECU.
Thus, the high level of trade with Russia provides a possible
argument for fixing to the rolible,  at least for those economies
that do not expect their trade patterns to shift drastically
towards the West.  The crucial qualification to the case for
fixing to the rouble is that there is no point in doing so unless
Russia succeeds in macroeconomic stabilization and, furthermore,
looks like being able to sustain this stabilization.  Any
Republic whose government believes that it could stabilize more
successfully on its own should certainly do so.  It could operate
a fixed but adjustable exchange rate system, preferably adjusting
frequently if required by its foreign exchange situation, and
25fixing in the short run to the D-Mark or the ECU.  At a later
stage, when Russia has fully stabilized its economy, the Republic
could switch from a D-Mark to a rouble peg.
4. MONETARY INTEGRATION
Finally, for the non-Russian Republics, the possibility of
monetary integration with Russia should be noted.  This, of
course, is an extreme version of a fixed exchange rate
commitment.  It is the present situation  (January 1992).
Each Republic is still using the rouble, which is the Russian
currency.12 Here there are essentially two possibilities.
First, a true monetary union embracing the fifteen Republics
might be established, with a single central bank subject to
control by all the member Republics' governments, or appointees
of  these governments.  Seigniorage would be distributed to the
member Republics in some agreed way.  The central bank might be
quite independent, and if its constitution required it to pursue
a policy of price stability, it would be rather similar to the
central bank envisaged in the recently agreed proposals for a
European Monetary Union.  The problem here is that such a union
is bound to be dominated by Russia.  Monetary policy--and hence
the exchange rate relative to the outside world--would be
determined by Russian considerations.  It is not conceivable that
Russia would accept anything else, given that its economy is so
large relative to the others.  But some Republics, notably
Ukraine, would hardly accept such dominance.  At the time of
writing, the establishment of such a Union involving joint
12 In the case of Ukraine a process of monetary
disintegration  is underway, the details of which are not
really relevant here.
26decision making does not appear likely on political grounds,
quite apart from economic implications.
The second possibility is that a Republic operate a "currency
board" system with a firmly fixed exchange rate to the rouble
and no ability of the monetary authority to create credit.  The
Republic could have its own currency, but it would be fully
backed by roubles.  There would, of course, be no exchange
controls between it and Russia, as well as other countries with
similar currency boards.  Any loss of foreign exchange reseives
would lead to an automatic decline in the money supply.  This
is similar to the system that operates in the African franc
zone--the CFA countries.  In practice it differs little from
the monetary union described above, except that in this case
control over monetary policy is fully handed over to Russia.
If the Republic received interest on its rouble reserves, the
seigniorage from money creation would accrue to it; otherwise it
would accrue to Russia.  One cannot imagine a Republic agreeing
to such a system unless it did receive interest.
If a Republic is small; if the argument for fixing the exchange
rate to the rouble is strong because trade with Russia is
expected to be very high for a long time, dominating the
country's trade; and if Russia is expected to succeed in
macroeconomic stabilization; then the case for going all the
way and monetarily integrating with Russia becomes quite strong.
Perhaps this applies to the central Asian Republics.  If it is
intended to maintain a fixed exchange rate indefinitely, it is
better to lock it in through an institutional arrangement so as
to avoid any foreign exchange speculation.  While accepting
Russian dominance, the Republic might be represented on the
central bank board so that its voice would at least be heard.
27III
TRADE  OLICIES
Trade policy for a single Republic will now be considered.  The
issue of whether the Republics should form, or maintain, a free
trade area will be left aside for the moment.  It will thus be
assumed that all measures apply to exports to or imports from all
countries with which the Republic trades.  It will also be
assumed that the Republic concerned has established what is
primarily a market economy.  There is both commodity and current
account convertibility.  Any trade restrictions take the form of
tariffs, import quotas or export controls and taxes, and not
exchange controls for current account transactions.  As already
discussed, export taxes or controls may be needed in particular
cases where prices to domestic consumers are kept below market
levels, taxes being far preferable to controls.
There remain now a variety of issues concerning the use of trade
policy interventions, issues which are similar to those discussed
extensively in the existing literature of trade policy  for market
economies.
1.  TRADE TAXES FOR  REVENUE
Tariffs and export taxes raise revenue.  Provided the exchange
rate is adjusted appropriately,  a uniform tariff will have a
similar effect to that of a uniform export tax.  Both will tend
to restrict trade.  This is an important equivalence, though
it does depend on exchange rate flexibility. 13 During the
adjustment period the fiscal problems of the Republics are likely
13  This is A.P.  Lerner's "symmetry theorem."  It is
explained fully in Corden  (1971, pp. 119-122).
28to be such that any tax that is politically acceptable and can be
readily collected will be desirable, provided iLt  does not create
excessive distortions.  One has to remember, as noted earlier,
the overwhelming importance of budget deficits as the sources of
the monetary disequilibrium.  Export taxes may well be the most
convenient and politically acceptable way of raising revenue--at
least as a supplement to more desirable consumption and income
taxes.  But tariffs to raise revenue--especially a uniform
tariff--cannot be ruled out.
If the tariff is uniform and at modest levels, it is
unlikely to be too distortionary.  A tariff structure that were
"made-to-measure" to the needs of particular domestic industries
or consumers  (a  concept to be discussed again later), and that
were continually varied, would provide undesirable opportunities
for rent-seeking and bureaucratic meddling.  A simple uniform
tariff, possibly with a few exemptions, is far preferable.
Refunds ("drawbacks") to exporters using imported inputs might
be provided.  If a value-added tax were imposed on domestic
production, with production  for exports exempted (a  method of
taxation used in the European Community, and widely advocated  for
other countries), a complementary tariff is needed to turn the
value-added tax system into a tax on domestic consumption.  By
the time of the normalcy period, any taxes that discriminate
against trade should ideally have been replaced by consumption,
value-added or income taxes as sources of revenue.
2.  POLICY  INSTRUMENTS TO  AVOID
Import quotas, exchange controls for current account
'ransactions, and made-to-measure  tariffs should be avoided.
The aim of opening a Republic's economy to trade would not only
be to equilibrate demand and supply conditions in the domestic
29market, and to obtain the familiar benefits of comparative
advantage, but it would, above all, be to provide competition
for local enterprises which would otherwise be able to exploit
monopoly positions resulting from the extreme specialization of
production.  (This was the primary motivation  for the ending
of import controls in Russia  in January 1992.)  When it is
impossible to generate domestic competitors  in a short period,
it is essential to introduce foreign competition.  This objective
is still compatible with moderate tariff levels, provided the
tariff levels are -Zixed  and predictable.  But all quantitative
restrictions on trade or on converting the local currency into
foreign currency for trade transactions should be avoided.
Exchange controls for current account transactions which
discriminate between different uses of foreign currency have
the same sorts of effects as quantitative restrictions on trade.
The difference is more administrative  than  economic, except that
exchange controls can also apply to the use of currency for trade
in services, where quantitative restrictions on the actual trade
are more difficult to apply.
A tariff which is not so high as to exclude imports
completely, and which is not deliberately varied to maintain
the profitability of a local protected  industry, will still allow
competitive pressure from abroad.  The price of the imported good
in the domestic market  (including the tariff and transport
costs) sets an upper limit to the prices that can be charged for
domestically produced goods that are close substitutes.  The
higher the tariff, the higher the price, but as long as there can
be potential imports, some limit is set to the price a domestic
producer can charge.  By contrast, a quota shelters the domestic
producer much more, even when some imports are allowed:  the
domestic price is insulated from the foreign price.
30Insofar as tariffs are used for any reason, they should in
general not be "made-to-measure" to meet the specific needs of
particular protected  industries.  They should not be reduced when
the industry is more successful and makes higher profits, nor
raised when its profits fall.  Some non-uniformity of tariffs may
be unavoidable, and even desirable, but the general point of the
need to avoid such adjustments should be borne in mind.
It appears to be "common sense" to adjust tariffs (or other
protective devices)  in this way, and to vary the rate of tariffs
protecting particular  domestically produced products on the basis
of need, prov:ding high tariffs for industries in difficulties
and low or no tariffs at all for those that are doing well.  But
this "made-to-measure" method has a disincentive effect. It has
similar effects to that of a profits tax, which--if at all--is
better imposed at moderate rates directly.  Furthermore, it
introduces elements of arbitrariness, makes the tariff system
unduly complex, and provides opportunities  for rent-seeking, all
features of the economic system which the former Soviet Republics
are seeking to leave behind.
It seems quite likely that the natural tendency will be to use
tariff policy, and indeed other interventions, in this way, since
it conforms with the traditional approach in the Soviet system.
This approach has been well described by Litvak  (1991,  p. 82):
Salaries, bonuses, and other decentralized funds are
regulated on a discretionary basis, with the purpose of
expropriating excess profits from organizations that
reveal themselves  to be more productive and
guaranteeing  'normal' salaries and bonuses. ...  The
essence of this system is captured by a Russian word
that has found its way into the vocabulary of all the
Eastern European countries: uravnilovka, which
translates as 'equalization' or 'levelization.' ...
Inequalities are observed and subsequently leveled off.
31A break with this approach is clearly required. Rules need to
replace discretion, as far as possible, complexities in policy
instruments  should be avoided, and firms should be allowed to
profit from success in import competition and exporting.
3. TARIFFS FOR BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS REASONS
It has already been observed that, if the exchange rate is
fixed or is devalued only reluctantly, in the face of a
balance-of-payments problem, there will be a tendency to use
tariffs or import quotas  (in  conjunction with a decline in
domestic expenditure) to equilibrate the balance-of-payments
and maintain demand for domestic goods.  This tendency provides
a  strong argument against fixing the exchange rate, or against
devaluing only reluctantly.  To avoid this tendency in a
fixed exchange rate regime, nominal wages would need to be
flexible downwards, so that a required improvement in the
competitiveness of domestic industry would be brought about not
by nominal depreciation, or by tariff increases, but by declines
in wages.  Yet, such downward wage flexibility is improbable.
Nevertheless, there are some arguments in favor of fixing the
exchange rate even when nominal wages are not flexible, these
applying more strongly to small economies.  In any case,
"first-best" policies are often not followed.  Hence,
"second-best" issues remain.  Given that trade restrictions
will be used, which would be the best pattern and method of
restrictions?  The common instinct is to impose quantitative
import restrictions and to vary them according to "essentiality."
This is a non-price approach which may well appeal in the
former Soviet Republics and, in the past, has appealed in many
developing countries.  But an alternative--which is preferable
when there is a desire to move permanently away from quantity
controls and towards market incentives--is to use tariffs.
32one simple approach would be for the Republic to impose a
uniform nominal tariff on imports which would normally  (for
revenue purposes) be at some modest  level, say 10%, but which
would be raised temporarily when there is a balance-of-payments
problem.  Imports of "essential" goods would not fall much, if at
all,  their demand elasticities being low, while consumers and
producers would reduce imports of "non-essentials," these being
the goods with the high demand elasticities.  Thus the market
would automatically discriminate on the basis of "essentiality"
as perceived by buyers.  Possibly exporters might get rebates on
tariffs paid on imported inputs.  For various reasons, such a
flexible uniform nominal tariff would not yield a uniform
effective tariff rate (tariff rate relative to value-added), and
furthermore it would produce some bias in favor of import
substitution against exporting.  Hence, it would be a very
imperfect substitute for a devaluation.  But its simplicity and
flexibility are attractive, and it should be considered if the
use of the exchange rate is ruled out.
4. IS THERE  NEED  FOR  TRANSITIONAL  PROTECTION
It may be argued that, if current account conv;ertibility  is
introduced and there is little or no protection, most or all
of a Republic's industries would not be able to compete against
imports from the outside world.  It appears to follow from this
argument that transitional tariffs during the adjustment period
are thus needed to avoid drastic losses of jobs in some, and
perhaps all, industries when the economy is opened up.  Because
of its low quality, much of domestic industrial output would be
uncompetitive under free trade, so that massive unemployment
would result from opening up the economies.  Here the experience
cf East Germany may be cited.
33There is a weakness in this argument.  Essentially, it appears to
confuse absolute and comparative advantage.  If a large part of
domestic industry turns out to be uneconomic when the economy is
opened up, the nominal exchange rate relative to the nominal wage
level must have been overvalued.  If nominal wages are taken as
given, and if the exchange rate is available as an instrument
of policy, there should be a devaluation, possibly a very
substantial one.  This would make many industries competitive
again, to the point if necessary, where external equilibrium is
restored.
But there is a complication, which suggests that there could be
some logic in the argument.  During the adjustment period the
industries of the former Soviet Union are likely to become
gradually more efficient:  hence, they would become more
competitive at a  given exchange rate and given wage level.  In a
free market the exchange rate would then tend to appreciate, or
the domestic wage level to rise.  The question is whether this
likelihood might justify transitional tariffs.  This issue of the
need for transitional protection  is certainly important, and it
can be clarified with the help of a diagram.  A number of
simplifying assumptions are made, but removing them would not
alter the main messages.
In Figure 2 the vertical axis shows the real exchange, a movement
upwards being a real devaluation.  With a given nominal wage
level and given constant foreign price level, this can be equated
with the nominal exchange rate.  Hence, the vertical axis shows
the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency.  The
horizontal axis shows the value of exports and imports in foreign
currency, and it will be assumed that they have to be equal.
Inequality would result from capital inflow or outflow, use of
foreign exchange reserves, and aid. S 1 is the short-run supply
curve of exports, showing that, in the short run, supply is
fixed, so that the value of export income is fixed.  S2 is the
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34along-run supply curve:  devaluation would increase exports.  D 1
is the deman'!  curve for imports.  It reflects both the domestic
demand for importables  (imports plus import-competing goods) and
the domestic supply of import-competing production.
Thinking of Russia, we can imagine the supply curve to refer
primarily to energy exports and the demand curve to imports of
manufactures of all kinds  (an obvious simplification).  Over time
domestic manufacturing will become more efficient, so that at a
constant exchange rate (constant nominal exchange rate and
constant domestic nominal wage level, with world prices given)
domestic output would increase, and so the demand for imports
would fall.  This is represented by a gradual movement of the
demand curve to the left from D 1 to D2. Such an efficiency
improvement would no doubt also take place in export industries,
hence shifting the supply curve to the right, a consideration
that is ignored in this argument, an important and limiting
assumption.
Suppose convertibility is introduced, there are no tariffs at
all, and the exchange is adjusted to maintain equilibrium  in the
balance of payments on current account (or is allowed to float).
It will then,  initially move to OK, with equilibrium at A.  As the
export supply curve becomes more elastic and the demand curve
shifts to the left, the exchange rate will appreciate, until
equilibrium at C is reached.
Before convertibility the exchange rate might have been, say, at
OH (the initial exchange rate at which exporters just covered
their costs and at whieh there was excess demand for imports).
Overshooting thus takes place:  first, the value of the currency
depreciates sharply, and then it gradually appreciates.
Initially export industries will obtain a windfall gain.  Since
trade is determined by comparative and not absolute advantage,
the fact that domestic manufacturing  is very inefficient, at
35least initially, does not alter the ability of the system to
ensure balance-of-payments equilibrium and the maintenance  of
employment.
An employment problem would arise only if the real exchange rate
could not be altered from its pre-convertibility level, either
because the nominal exchange rate were fixed or nominal wages
increased to compensate  for any devaluation.  In that case the
demand for imports would rise by HJ as a result of convertibility
(inconvertibility having limited imports to MH).
Where  is the argument for transitional tariffs?  This could be
made in the following way.  In deciding how much to produce,
exporters and import-competing producers are likely to look at
the exchange rate that becomes established directly after
convertibility, and not at the rate that will eventually emerge.
They will not practice "rational expectations."  The same applies
to domestic producers who use imported inputs. But the immediate
post-convertibility highly devaluied  exchange rate sends out a
false signal.  Not only would it give exporters a windfall  (which
could be temporarily taxed away) but it would lead them to
over-expand, aiming for point F on the diagram.  Similarly, as
import-competing producers become more efficient, they would
expand output on the basis of the initial exchange rate, moving
towards point E.  At the given exchange rate OK, a surplus would
thus emerge.  But this would lead to real appreciation that would
take away some of the improvements in competitiveness for these
tradable industries again.  There will be a disappointment of
expectations and a temporary misallocation of resources.
The suggestion  (or implication) is then that the exchange rate
should initially be set at a more appropriate long-term, less
depreciated, level.  Thus, it might be set at the long-term
equilibrium OL.  This would encourage exporters to move directly
to point C, while import-competing producers that foresaw their
36improvements in efficiency would move to output levels that
yielded a demand for imports at that level.  Yet, in the
transitional period import-competing producers would make losses.
In the absence of a tariff, at the exchange rate OL, their output
would fall, yielding demand for imports at G.  It follows that an
initial tariff equal to KL should be imposed, and this should be
gradually reduced as the demand curve shifts downwards.  If
domestic producers are to plan for the correct output level,
they should know firmly in advance that the tariff rate will be
reduced, and will eventually be eliminated.  They would then
use the exchange rate OL as their guide for long-term output
planning.
There are some obvious problems here, and the policy proposal
that has been expounded here is not necessarily one that should
be supported.  I have aimed here only at clarification.  The
proposal assumes that productivity improvements would take place
primarily in import-competing industries, not in export
industries.  Furthermore, it is hardly possible to predict the
equilibrium exchange rate (i.e., OL) for the end of the
adjustment period on the basis of which current planning would
take place.  The most one can say is that extreme overshooting of
the current exchange rate could be avoided by providing a
temporary uniform tariff well above the basic  (say 10%) rate
appropriate for revenue reasons alone.  But such a tariff does
discriminate against exports, and it must of course be temporary.
5. INFANT INDUSTRY PROTECTION AND A HARD TARIFF PATH
The general point of the preceding argument is that there can
sometimes be a case for temporary protection by means of tariffs
(quite  apart from revenue tariffs).  But it has to be remembered
that protection of one industry is always at the expense of
37other industries.  In the example just given, import-competing
industry is protected at the expense of export industries, and
the assumption  (not necessarily justified) was that gradual
improvements in efficiency would emerge in the former and not
the latter.
If a particular industry seeks infant-industry protection to
cover a period that would otherwise be loss-making in order to
build up experience, markets, and so on, for a later profitable
period when it would not need protection, it is usually suggested
that two questions should be asked.  First, why is it not able to
obtain credit from banks or investors to cover its initial
losses?  Second, why are its problems and future prospects
different from those of other industries?  In the case of the
ex-Soviet Republics, it can reasonably be assumed that the
capital market, insofar as it will exist at all, will be
imperfect and credit will not readily be obtainable.  But the
case for giving one industry special treatment relative to other
industries has still to be made.
Hence, the case for providing temporary infant-industry
protection for specific industries appears weak, though the
case for some general transitory protection, on the grounds
outlined above, is stronger, at least if one expects efficiency
improvements to be greater in import-competing than in export
industries.  But whether the temporary protection  is general or
specific, it is vital that a declining tariff rate path be
established and committed to in advance.  One might call this a
hard tariff Path.  A soft tariff path is one that is not clearly
established in advance, or if a commitment is made, it is not
firmly adhered to.  In the latter case, if an industry fails to
fulfil its promise, tariff making that responds to interest group
38pressures will prevenit  tariff rates declining predictably as they
should.  14
IV
THE FREE TRADE AREA ISSUE
For a number of reasons, the Republics may be tempted to impose
trade restrictions on trade with each other.  Great dislocations
might be caused by such restrictions.  Because of the extreme
specialization, the former Soviet Union is now a highly
integrated area, and while this degree of integration may
naturally decline when trade with the outside world  is opened up,
to force a further decline by means of trade restrictions would
impose undue dislocations and costs.  Hence, a strong case
exists in favor of the Republics forming a free trade area and
committing themselves to maintain it for a long period ahead.
The issue was already discussed earlier. Yet, in practice, a free
trade area may not be established, if only for nationalistic
reasons.  Furthermore, there are also some possible arguments on
the other side, and some of these will be discussed here. 15
14  McKinnon  (1991) has noted that some industries in the
ex-Soviet Union probably produce negative value added at world
prices--i.e., the cost of energy inputs valued at world prices
is greater than the value at world prices of gross output.  (The
concept of "negative value added" is expounded in Corden, 1971,
pp. 51-55.)  They have survived because of excessively low
domestic energy prices in the Soviet Union.  He suggests that, if
efficiency improvements and reduced energy use would eventually
turn them into (sufficiently) positive value-added producers,
they should be protected.  But this is just an extreme case of
the broader issue of whether infant industry protection should be
provided.  Even industries that produce positive value-added may
be uneconomic in the short run and yet economic eventually.
15  Gros and Steinherr  (1991,  pp. 33-38) have an
extensive discussion of whether a Soviet customs union should
be maintained.  In the case of the non-Russian European
Republics, they argue that they will eventually trade more with
391. POSSIBLE  ARGUMENTS AGAINST  A  FREE  TRADE  AREA
(a)  Fixed Exchanae Rate
One Republic may have committed itself to a fixed exchange
rate (perhaps fixing its currency to the D-mark) for the reasons
discussed earlier, and it may find that it has  overvalued  its
exchange rate, at least in the short run. Even without a fixed
rate commitment, it may have chosen to overvalue its exchange
rate to avoid a temporary excessive devaluation  (overshooting) of
the rate.  As also discussed above, it might then deal with the
problem by imposing or raising a uniform tariff--which would be
reduced as the country's industries become more competitive.  Let
us suppose that the problem does not arise for other Republics.
The question then arises whether the uniform tariff
should apply to all imports or only to imports from outside the
former Soviet Union.  On the one hand, if the competitiveness
problem is really caused by an inflow of imports from outside
owing to the sudden opening-up of trade, the problem might be
dealt with by just imposing the tariff on these imports and
preserving free trade with other Republics.  On the other hand,
the Republic concerned may be becoming much less competitive
relative to other Republics, and, in addition, the problem of
"trade deflection"  (discussed below) may arise.  If free trade
with other Republics is maintained,  imports may flood in from
other Republics, whether originating there, or in transit from
outside the former Soviet Union.
the European Community than with Russia, so thmat  it will be more
in their interest to join a European rather than a  former-Soviet
customs union.  It is implied, in this view, that the extreme
specialization will be greatly modified during the adjustment
period.  They may well be right.  But so far the Community has
been notably unwelcoming to new members from its East  (and their
exports).
40If the exchange rate becomes severely overvalued, the
imposition of the uniform tariff on all imports, including
imports from other Republics, may become difficult to avoid:
the free trade area may be endangered.  The moral is that
establishing a firmly fixed exchange rate regime by individual
Republics, or deliberate overvaluation of the rate in the short
run, can produce real problems and endanger the continuance of a
free trade area. Big problems for trade policy are created by a
decision to forego the exchange rate instrument.
(b) Revenue tariff
A uniform tariff designed to raise revenue could be imposed
either on imports from outside only--a free trade area being
maintained--or on all the Republic's imports, including imports
from other Republics.  If it is imposed only on outside imports,
the rate of tariff will have to be higher to yield the same
amount of revenue.  Taxing inter-Republic trade is clearly a
convenient source of revenue, a source which is foregone if a
free trade area is to be maintained.  If a free trade area is
maintained, trade will be less with countries outside the
former Soviet Union, but restriction of trade with other
Republics will be avoided.  A bias will be introduced against
trading with the outside world relative to "inside" trade, this
being the phenomenon of "trade diversion" discussed in the theory
of customs unions.  Indeed, this bias against "outside" trade
would exist even if the rate of tariff on imports from outside
did not have to be increased when inter-Republic tariffs are
foregone.
Clearly an excessive bias against trade with outside
brought about by a high tariff would be undesirable, because
foreign trade would then be unable to increase competition in the
domestic market substantially.  Increasing competition will be a
major benefit of such opening up, as has been noted above.  A
41supplier of a product from Republic B should face competition
from imports from outside the former Soviet Union in the market
of Republic A.  But the starting point--the recent situation,
before opening up--is an extreme bias against imports from
outside, with no competitive imports.  Even with tariffs of the
order of 10-20% the bias would be reduced, even though some bias
would remain.  One might regard such a bias as acceptable, given
the advantages of maintaining a free trade area for the sake of
keeping going  (and keeping down the costs of) the greater part of
existing inter-Republic trade. Provided the levels of tariffs are
not too high, the trade creation effects of keeping a free trade
area while imposing revenue tariffs on imports from outside are
likely to outweigh trade diversion effects. The aim should be to
maintain the free trade area.
(c)  ariffs for Particular Industries
Tariffs might be imposed to deal with the short-term
employment problems of particular industries when the economies
are opened up to trade with the outside world.  This has not been
recommended here, but may nevertheless happen.  The pressure for
such protection  is likely to become significant once enterprise
losses cease to be readily covered by subsidies from the banking
system--i.e., by money creation.  Proceeding then to second-best
analysis, if frme trade with other Republics is maintained, such
tariffs might conceivably  lead to trade diversion, i.e., there
might be extra imports from other Republics, replacing imlports
from outside.  While this effect is conceivable, it is unlikely
to be an important effect owing to the high degree of
specialization.  Insofar as other Republics also produce the
product.,  they may have similar short-term competitive problems.
Thus, these special short-term tariffs--if they are used--are
probably best imposed only on imports from outside while an
inter-Republic free trade area is maintained.
42(d) Price Controls and Export Taxes
A Republic may choose to maintain some price controls and
keep prices of certain goods to its domestic consumers below free
market levels.  This possibility was referred to above.  As
discussed there, to avoid these goods being exported at world
prices, export controls or export taxes would be required to
supplement price controls.  The question then arises whether
export controls or taxes should also apply to exports to other
Republics.
Clearly, from the point of view of preserving a free trade
area and getting all its benefits, it is undesirable that exports
to other republics be taxed or controlled.  Furthermore, there
would be no need for such export taxes or controls if similar
controlled prices applied in the other Republics.  But
if free market prices  (or much higher controlled prices) were
maintained in some other Republics, a diversion of sales away
from the domestic market to the other Republics would take
place in the absence of controls or taxes.  Thus, it would be
difficult to avoid export controls or export taxes and so
breaching the free trade aiea principle.  Controlling prices
of certain goods to domestic consumers would either have to be
avoided completely, or would have to be coordinated between
Republics, if a free trade area is to be preserved. This is an
important issue at the time of writing  (January 1992).  Republics
other than Russia are under pressure to follow Russia in price
liberalization since export taxes or controls are difficult to
impose, and also undesirable.
2. FREE TRADE AREA OR CUSTOMS UNION?
So far no distinction  has been made between a free trade area and
a customs union.  Two Republics that form a free trade area could
43still have distinct policies influencing trade with the outside
world.  One Republic might impose a high tariff on goods  imported
from outside, and the other a lw  tariff.  By contrast, if they
formed a customs union they would, in addition, need to have the
same tariff rates (and export taxes) on external trade.  From the
point of view of trade policy, they would be more like a single
country, with a common external tariff structure.  It is also
conceivable that they form a free trade area for some goods and a
customs union--in effect, a partial customs union--for others.
Given that free trade between the Republics is desired, the
choice between free trade area and customs union involves a
balance of considerations.
A  free trade area creates the problem of "trade deflection."
If Republic A has a low or zero tariff on imports from outside,
while Republic B has a high tariff, goods from outside will tend
to be imported into Republic B via Republic A, so that B's high
tariff would, in effect be evaded.  If one believes that low
tariffs or free trade are really desirable, one should welcome
such evasion.  Good policies would, again, have driven out bad
policies.  But the protectionist Republic is unlikely to accept
this outcome.  To avoid trade deflection, trade barriers
between A and B would have  to be set up to check the origins
of goods:  goods originating from outside would have to pay a
tariff.  This can get very complicated, bearing in mind that
goods imported into high-tariff Republic B from low-tariff
Republic A may have components originally imported from outside,
but also have value-added  in A.  A "certificates of origin"
system is usually used.  Opportunities for arbitrary bureaucratic
decision making then arise.
The problem would be avoided if the differences in tariff levels
were small, or if transport costs were high.  Thus  (unless
tariffs are low in any case), from this point of view, a customs
44union--where there is no incentive for trade deflection--is
clearly preferable.
The problem about a customs union is political:  it would
be necessary to get agreement between the Republics about the
common tariff policy to be applied to outside trade, and this
may be difficult.  For example, the survival of an industry in
one Republic may be greatly threatened by the opening up of
external trade, even though, allowing time for adjustment, it
can reasonably be expected to survive.  Thus, this Republic may
want to impose a temporary  infant industry tariff.  But other
Republics, being net consumers of the product concerned, would
benefit from free trade.
The general conclusion  is that all these problems would be
avoided if the use of tariffs  (and import restrictions) were
minimized, and if such tariffs were generally kept low.  Insofar
as they are used, it would be better if a customs union were
maintained and some collective arrangement among the Republics
were established to determine the common tariff levels to apply
to all their imports from outside.  Possibly the members of the
customs union might agree to establish a semi-independent Tariff
Commission.  This might have written into its Constitution some
general rules about tariffs, for example, that any tariffs above
a certain percentage should not be maintained for more than a
defined number of years.
3.  MONETARY INTEGRATION AND TRADE INTEGRATION
An area of monetary integration need not coincide with an
area of trade integration, i.e., a free trade area or customs
union.  Thus, two Republics might have separate moneys and
exchange rate policies, and yet they might still commit
45themselves to maintaining free trade with each other.  This,
indeed, has been the position in the European Community.16
It is also conceivable that two or more Republics  form an
area of monetary integration but not an area of free trade: i.e
they maintain fixed exchange rates relative to each other, or
literally have a common monetary policy, and yet still feel free
to impose trade restrictions on each other.  For example, for
many years up to 1976, Mexico maintained a fixed exchange rate
to the dollar and yet imposed restrictions on imports of US (and
other) goods.  And within Canada--an area of complete monetary
integration--some restrictions have been imposed by the provinces
on imports of goods or services from each other.  But the latter
is unusual.
In any case, it is desirable that an area of monetary
integration also be a free trade area.  The reason is that the
inability to make an exchange rate adjustment between two
countries that form part of a single monetary union is likely to
lead to excessive use of trade restrictions when an adverse shock
that increases local unemployment occurs.  There has to be some
wage flexibility to take over the role of the exchange rate. If
the Republics were still free to impose tariffs or quantitative
restrictions on trade with each other while they were not able
to alter exchange rates, a high level of restrictions might well
result. Finally, while an area of monetary integration, should
thus also be a free trade area, the case for a free trade area
may also stand even if they do not form an area of monetary
integration.
16  In the European Monetary System  (EMS),  exchange
rates have frequently been realigned relative to each other eve,.
though certain common rules have been followed and short-term
fluctuations have been avoided.  Hence, the EMS has not been an
area of monetary integration.
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SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES
One approach to trade policy is, in effect, to have no trade
policy.  Currencies would be made convertible, at least for
current account transactions, and all use of quotas, tariffs,
export taxes and export subsidies would be foresworn.  Credit
would be made available for export development, as for other
activities, on the basis of normal banking principles practiced
in market economies.  All enterprises, state-owned and private,
would be free to engage in foreign trade themselves or use any
intermediaries they chose, and certainly would not have to use
state trading organizations.  This would be true "free trade" and
could w-ll be the most desirable policy, at least for the
normal-.:v  period.  But, for the various reasons discussed, there
are some reasonable arguments for taLiffs and possibly export
taxes, especially in order to raise revenue; furthermore, strong
pressure for trade intervention, particularly for protection
from imports coming from outside the former Soviet Union, can be
expected, and it is probable that the same forces and attitudes
that prevent the attainment of complete free trade in market
economies  (and that, for example, have stood in the way of the
rapid completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations) will
develop in the Republics of the former Soviet Union.  In view of
this, the following four general principles should be kept in
mind.
(1)  As far as possible, barriers to existing trade
between the Republics should not be set up.  This trade should
be encouraged to continue, though gradually it may change its
character and be reducea for two reasons:  supplies from outside
may replace supplies from other Republics, and excessive and
artificial specialization in production may be modified or ended
47by more decentr".ization  of production brought about by natural
market forces.  16 But measures designed to deliberately reduce
inter-Republic trade  (possibly for nationalistic reasons) would,
in the short run at least, cause severe dislocations.
(2)  All quantitative and control measures should be avoided
so as to minimize bureaucratic decision-making of a detailed
kind, rent-seeking, and the delays that go with such measures
and thus raise the costs of trading.  Only tariffs and export
taxes should thus be used as instruments of trade policy.
(3)  Tariff and e*port tax structures should be very
simple.  It might be best if there were just one single uniform
nominal tariff or export tax f-- revenue purposes.  Proceeding
to second-best possibilities, a uniform tariff might be varied
over time, since some case for this can be made.  Possibly it
might not be applied tJ  all imports.  Perhaps it might be
supplemented by a limited number of special tariffs, or there
might  be some exemptions  (notably in the form of drawbacks for
imports used as inputs in exports).  If the uniform tariff rate
is kept low--or, even it starts high  but is gradually reduced to
a low level--the distortions resulting from uniformity would not
be great, and would be compensated by the administrative and
other advantages of simplicity.17
16  Once transportation within the former Soviet Union is
costed properly, some of this specialization may also be reduced.
17  17  A uniform nominal tariff, particularly if it
does not apply to all imports, is unlikely to produce a uniform
effective tariff structure  (the effective tariff rate refers to
protection in relation to value added). It is thus likely to
yield somewhat uneven incentives for domestic production,
favoring those industries that get high effective protection,
possibly because they use imported inputs  on which there are no
tariffs, or inputs which are also exported, the prices of which
are determined by export, not import, prices.
48(4)  Finally, transparency in trade policy is highly
desirable.  Of course, a simple uniform tariff is indeed
transparent and presents no problem.  But the tariff and
export structure might get complicated as a result of the
addition of various special tariffs or exemptions to
the basic uniform tariff.  An institution such as a Tariff
Commission might be set up that advises on, and possibly actually
determines, the tariff and export tax structure, and also
analyzes its economic effects.  It should be independent of the
day-to-day political process.  Its decision-making processes
should be open.  If some or all Republics agreed on forming a
customs union, this Tariff Commission would have to be a joint
one, with members appointed by t'Ae  various Republican
governments.  Furthermore, it should be concerned with the
interests of consumers, and not just producers.
49APPENDIX
This paper has been mainly about the adjustment period, not the
transition, which is now in progress, and the success of which is
still uncertain.  Thus, it hardly deals with the immediate
problems that go well beyond the issues discussed  in this
paper--such as the need for a legal framework for private
activities and a market, not to speak of major redistributive
effects.  Indeed, it must be admitted that the paper deals with
the easy issues, and hence it may seem somewhat unrealistic.
But, like the other writings to which I have referred, it does
try to look ahead, perhaps with an implied optimism.
In this Appendix I  shall use a simple diagram to highlight two
problems of the transition, focussing on the question:  given
that there is price liberalization, what are the implications of
opening up, i.e., introducing current account convertibility and
removing any controls on imports?  I consider the market for a
single potentially import-competing product.  When a curve is
drawn, it should be understood that its position and slope will
be quite uncertain to participants in the market, and the curves
may rapidly change anyway.
In Figure 3 the pre-liberalization price is P., the demand
curve is DD, and the supply curve SS.  Initially output is at A.
There is, at this stage, neither price nor trade liberalization.
If price liberalization were introduced without trade
liberalization, and producers were competitive  (I assume that
buyers are), output would rise to B.  Of course, the price would
rise, with inevitable and problem-creating redistributive
effects.  But that might  be accepted  as the cost of inducing
increased supplies on the market.
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50-aNow problem One.  Supplies may be monopolized  (as they very often
are in the ex-Soviet Union).  It will pay to keep supply below B
so as to raise the price further.  The profit-maximizing price
might be at C, so that supply would actually fall.  The objective
of getting increased supplies would have been defeated. The
monopolist,  lacking experience of price-gouging, may not have
judged the demand elasticity correctly, and may have raised the
price so much that he settles on a point like E, where hardly
anything is bought.  Anecdotes reported in the press tell us that
this has been happening. No doubt he will feel his way towards C.
The apparent solution is to open up the economy.  A price will
eventually be set by the cost of imports at the prevailing
exchange rate, also allowing, of course, for transport and other
transaction costs.  If this price is below P 2 it will achieve
the objective of limiting monopoly exploitation and if it is
at  or below P1 it will do so completely.  That is thk standard
argument (also given in this paper) for opening up, quite apart
from the comparative advantage argument.
But now we get problem Two.  It is quite uncertain where the
import price will be.  It will depend  on the pattern of world
prices, on the degree of substitutability of foreign for
particular domestic goods, and so on, and also on the exchange
rate, which brings about a general equilibrium adjustment when
many markets are being opened up.  Perhaps the import price will
be below P 0, possibly well below.  In that case, domestic output
will fall, and perhaps cease.  We now have the familiar
unemployment problem.  To cope with the monopoly problem we
have created the possibility of a new short-term problem.
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